Most traditional models of uncertainty have focused on the associational relationship among variables as captured by conditional dependence. In order to successfully man age intelligent systems for decision making, however, we must be able to predict the ef fects of actions. In this paper, we attempt to unite two branches of research that address such predictions: causal modeling and deci sion analysis. First, we provide a definition of causal dependence in decision-analytic terms, which we derive from consequences of causal dependence cited in the literature. Using this definition, we show how causal depen dence can be represented within an influence diagram. In particular, we identify two in adequacies of an ordinary influence diagram as a representation for cause. We introduce a special class of influence diagrams, called causal influence diagrams, which corrects one of these problems, and identify situations where the other inadequacy can be elimi nated. In addition, we describe the relation ships between Howard Canonical Form and existing graphical representations of cause.
Introduction
Most traditional models of uncertainty, including Markov networks [Lauritzen, 1982] and belief networks [Pearl, 1988] have focused on the associational rela tionship among variables as captured by conditional independence and dependence. Associational knowl edge, however, is not sufficient when we want to make decisions under uncertainty. For example, al though we know that smoking and lung cancer are probabilisti cally dependent, we cannot conclude from this knowl edge that we will increase our chances of getting lung cancer if we start smoking. In general, to make ratio nal decisions, we need to be able to predict the effects of our actions.
Recent work by Artificial Intelligence researchers, statisticians, and philosophers-for example, Pearl and Verma (1991) , Druzdzel and Simon (1993) , and Spirtes et a!. (1993)-have emphasized the impor tance of identifying causal relationships for purposes of modeling the effects of intervention. They argue, for example, that if we believe that smoking causes lung cancer, then we know that if we start to smoke then we will increase our chances of getting lung can cer. In contrast, if we believe that there is a gene that causes both lung cancer and our desire to smoke, then we know that if we start to smoke then we will not increase our chances of getting lung cancer.
For over a decade, decision analysts have used the influence diagram to represent decisions problems [Howard and Matheson, 1981] . In doing so, they have worried about representing the effects of interventions (decisions) on a set of uncertain variables. Nonethe less, they have avoided using notions of causality in their work, in large part because no precise definition of causality has been proposed.
In this paper, we attempt to weave together these two threads of research. In particular, we propose a defi nition of causal dependence in clear decision-analytic terms, which we derive from consequences of such de pendence often cited in the causal modeling litera ture. We thereby offer a means by which the results in each discipline may be translated to the other. Thus, for example, decision analysts may translate calculus of intervention to a method for proving stochastic dominance. Conversely, researchers work ing on causal modeling can use influence diagrams in Howard Canonical Form for planning under uncer tainty.
Given the audience of this paper, we concentrate mostly on translating results from decision analysis to the representation and manipulation of causal de pendence. After defining causal dependence, we show how it can be represented within an influence diagram. We identify two inadequacies of the influence diagram as a representation for cause, and introduce a special class of influence diagrams, called causal influence di agrams, which corrects one of these problems. In ad- 
Background
Fundamental to our discussion is the distinction be tween a chance variable and a decision variable. In general, a variable has a (possibly infinite) set of mu tually exclusive and collectively exhaustive possible states. The state of a decision variable is chosen by a person, usually called the decision maker. In con trast, a chance variable is uncertain and its state may be at most indirectly affected by the decision maker's choices. For example, the decision to smoke or not is a decision variable, whereas whether or not a person develops lung cancer is a chance variable. We shall use lowercase letters to denote single variables, and upper case letters to denote sets of variables. We call an as signment of state to every variable in set X an instance of X. Typically, we refer to the possible states of a de cision variable as alternatives. We use a probability distribution P{X[Y} to represent a decision maker's uncertainty about X, given that a set of chance and/ or decision variables Y is known or determined.
In this paper, we are interested in modeling relation ships in a domain consisting of chance variables U and decision variables D. We use the influence diagram to model these relationships. An influence diagram is ( 1) a directed acyclic graph containing decision and chance nodes corresponding to decision and chance variables, and information and relevance arcs, representing what is known at the time of a decision and probabilistic dependence, respectively, (2) a set of probability dis tributions associated with each node, and optionally
(3) a set of utilities for all possible instances of U U D. A belief network is an influence diagram containing only chance nodes and relevance arcs.
An information arc is one that points to a decision node. An information arc from chance or decision node a to decision node d encodes the assertion that variable a will be known when decision d is made. (We shall use the same notation to refer to a variable and its corresponding node in the diagram.)
A relevance arc is one that points to a chance node.
The absence of a relevance arc represents conditional independence.
To identify relevance arcs, we ask the decision maker to order the vari ables in U = (.:riJ . .. , Xn)· Then, for each vari 3
Fixed Sets and Cause
In this paper, we take a practical view for our defi nition of causality. Rather than ask "what is causal ity?," we ask "what do we use the notion of causality for?" Answering the first question is extremely dif ficult. Philosophers have been arguing over the an swer for centuries. Answering the second question is straightforward. When a chance variable x causes a chance variable y, we know that any intervention that results in the same state of x will lead to the same state of y. Knowing this correspondence is useful for mod eling decision problems . If we know that x causes y, then we know that if we represent the relationship be tween x and y, this relationship will remain unchanged in the face of decisions that change only x directly. In this paper, we take this useful property of causality to be its definition.
To define causality, we must fi rst formalize the more primitive notion of a fixed set.
Definition 1 (Fixed Set) Given uncertain variables U and decisions D, the fixed set for U with respect to D, denoted F(D), is the set of variables in U that take on the same states regardless of the choice of D. The conditional fixed set for U given C with respect to D, denoted F(DIC) , is the set of variables in U which take on the same instance for any given instance of C, regardless of the choice of D.
In our lifestyles example, it is reasonable to assert that genotype is in the fi xed set for D = {smoke, diet}, because we expect that genotype will be the same regardless of the decisions made. Also, we may as sert that length of life is in the conditional fixed set F(Dicardiovascular status, lung cancer), because we believe that length of life will be the same, once we know cardiovascular status and lung cancer, regardless of the decisions made. Note that, in this example and in general, the order in which decisions D are made is irrelevant to the identification of fixed sets.
Conditioning on C in the definition of conditional fixed set is different from probabilistic conditioning. In par ticular, when we assess P{xiC}, we imagine that C 2The clairvoyant can only know the future conditioned on the decisions to be made. We address this point in the following section.
has been observed. When we assess F(DIC), however, C may depend on D; and so C cannot be observed prior to our choice for D. Instead, we imagine that we have made decisions D and subsequently observe C. We then identify the set of variables that take on the same instance for any possible choice of D whenever C takes on the same instance.
Membership in a conditional fixed set is closely re lated to conditional independence. Most important, both concepts are subjective. The assertion that x is in the fixed set F(DIC) belongs to a particular deci sion maker, just as does the assertion that x and D and conditionally independent given C. In addition, when x and Dare conditionally independent given C, then one's belief in x does not change with changes in D if C is known. When x is in the conditional fixed set F(DIC), then x itself does not change with changes in D once C is known. Thus, fixed set mem bership is stronger than is conditional independence:
, then x and D are conditionally in dependent given C. We note that X � F(DIC) in terpreted as the I-statement I(D, C, X) satisfies the graphoid axioms [Pearl, 1988] of decomposition, weak union, and contraction, but not symmetry.
If a chance variable xis not in the fixed set with respect to D, then-to some extent-it is under the control of the decision maker. Consequently, neither the decision maker nor the clairvoyant can observe x prior to the decisions D being made. Conversely, if x is in the fixed set with respect to D, then it is not under the control of the decision maker and may be observed-at least in principle. We call this observation the fundamental property of fixed set observation.
Proposition 1 (Fixed Set Observation) Prior to making a commitment to a set of decisions D, it is impossible to observe those variables outside the fixed set F(D), and we may observe those variables in that fixed set.
We can now formalize our definition of cause.
Definition 2 (Cause) Given uncertain variables U and decisions D, the variables C are causes for
The second condition formalizes the notion that x does not change with a set of decisions D, given a set of chance variables C. The first condition guaran tees that the second condition is not satisfied trivially.
That is, the first condition guarantees that the deci sions D can affect x. The minimality condition pre vents some causes of C from being superfluous. Note that, by our definition, causes may be decisions and/or chance variables, but only chance variables may be caused. Figure 2 help us to illustrate the definition. Some conclusions that can be drawn about each domain are shown next to the influence diagram for that domain. First, let us consider the decision problem in Figure 2a . Here, we model only the decision of whether or not to smoke; and we do not bother to model the variable length of life. For this problem, it is reasonable to as sert that lung cancer is not in the fixed set F (smoke). Also, it is true trivially that lung cancer is in the con ditional fixed set F(smokeismoke). Consequently, by our definition, we can conclude that {smoke} is a sin gleton cause for lung cancer. Similarly, we may con clude that {smoke} is a cause for smoking pleasure. In addition, it is reasonable to assert that utility is not in F( smoke), utility is in the conditional fixed set F(smokeismoking pleasure, lung cancer), and there is no subset C of {smoking pleasure, lung cancer} such that utility is in F(smokejC). Therefore, we can conclude that {smoking pleasure, lung cancer} are causes for utility. As shown in the figure, we may also conclude that {smoke} is a cause for utility. This example illustrates an important property of our defi nition: causes are not unique. Someday, it may be possible to use retroviral ther apy to alter one's genetic makeup. Assuming that a decision of whether or not to undergo such ther apy is available, it is reasonable to assert that geno type is not in the fixed set with respect to D : {smoke, retroviral therapy}.
Variants of our lifestyles decision problem shown in
In contrast, it is reasonable to assert that genotype is in the condi tional fixed set F(Djretroviral therapy). Therefore, { retroviral therapy} is a singleton cause for geno type. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assert that lung cancer is not in F(D), that lung cancer is in F(Djsmoke, genotype), and that for no subset C of {smoke, genotype} is lung cancer in F(DIC). Thus, we can conclude that {smoke, genotype} are causes for lung cancer. This example demonstrates that the conclusions drawn about cause and effect, given our definition, depend strongly on what decisions are avail able. Thus, as in our formal defi nition, we say that {smoke, genotype} are causes for lung cancer with re spect to {smoke, retroviral therapy}.3
The influence diagram in Figure 2b corresponds to an "alternative" view of the relationships between the de cision to smoke and lung cancer. Here, smoking is not a cause for lung cancer. Rather, genotype is a cause for lung cancer, and both genotype and smoking are causes for smoking pleasure. As mentioned in the in troduction, these two views predict differently what would happen should one start smoking. This exam ple emphasizes that our definition of cause and effect is subjective. One person may hold beliefs correspond ing to the model in Figure 2a , whereas another person may hold beliefs corresponding to the model in Fig  ure 2b . Both people are "correct" provided they make their decisions in a manner that is consistent with their beliefs.
Our definition of causality is satisfying for several rea sons. One, it is consistent with a universally accepted notion of causality: an effect cannot precede its cause. In particular, we cannot observe a chance variable that is caused by a decision before we make that decision.
Also, it satisfies the reasonable property that x and y cannot cause each other, except for the special case where x and y are related deterministically. Namely, if { x} is a cause for y with respect to D and {y} is a cause for x with respect to D, then one can show that x must be a deterministic function of y and D (and y must be a deterministic function of x and D).
We emphasize that our definition allows us to use causality to model actions more than it explains the fundamental notion of causality. We do not consider this a practical weakness, because unless we can in tervene, recognition of causality has no benefit. For example, if a variable is in the fixed set with respect to our decisions, then there is no use in identifying what we would otherwise perceive as its causes.
4
Graphical Representation of Cause:
Causal Influence Diagrams
Given the known benefits of the belief network for representing conditional independence, we should ex pect that a graphical representation of cause and effect would be useful. In the previous section, we saw that our notion of cause and effect is intimately related to the notion of the (conditional) fixed set. Thus, we de sire a graphical representation in which we can encode the existence or lack thereof of fixed sets.
At first glance, the influence diagram appears to be such a representation. In particular, consider the fol-3To be brief, we often omit this last clause in our asser tions of causal dependence. If we reexamine our examples in Figure 2 , we see that whenever x is not blocked from D by the empty set that is, whenever there is a path from a decision node to x-then x is not in the fixed set F(D). In addi tion, whenever x is blocked from D by C, then x is in the fixed set F(DIC). Thus, in these examples, we may read cause and effect directly from the influence diagram.
In other examples, however, this correspondence be tween the graphical condition of blocking and fixed sets breaks down. Consider the simple decision prob lem shown in Figure 3a . Here, we have the decision d of whether or not to bet heads or tails on the outcome of a coin flip c. Whether or not we win is represented by the variable w. Note that w is a deterministic func tion of d and c (indicated by the double oval) . Suppose we believe that the coin is fair-that is p(heads):::: l/2. In this case, if we do not bother to model the variable c explicitly, as shown in Figure 3b , we need not place an arc from d tow, because the probability of winning will be 1/2, regardless of our choice d. Nonetheless, w is not in the fixed set F(d), because w will take on dif ferent states for different bets. Consequently, we have a situation where there is no path from d to w, and yet w is not in the fixed set F( d).
Conversely, consider a subset of our lifestyles decision problem shown in Figure 4a . If we choose not to model the variable genotype, we can obtain the influence di agram shown in Figure 4b . In this influence diagram, we cannot remove any arc without producing invalid assertions of conditional independence. Nonetheless, cardiovascular status is in the fixed set F(Djdiet).
In order to discuss clearly the inadequacies of the in fluence diagram for the representation of fixed sets, we introduce the following concepts, which closely parallel Pearl's concepts of I-map and 'D-map. 4 As is made clear in the proofs of Theorems 1 and 2, we do not need the full d-separation criterion.
(a) (b) Figure 4 : A subset of the lifestyles decision problem.
In our coin example, the influence diagram in Fig  ure 3b is an F-map, but not an .1'-map. Conversely, in our smoking example, the influence diagram in Fig  ure 4b is an .1'-map, but not an F-map.
We can guarantee that an influence diagram is an .1' map by adding additional arcs to it. In the coin ex ample, having learned from the decision maker that w is not in the fixed set with respect to d, we ca.n add an arc from d to w, making the diagram an .1'-map. In general, however, we do not want to burden a deci sion maker with the task of guaranteeing that all fixed set assertions implied by the blocking condition are valid. Fo rtunately, we can obtain such a guarantee, by asking the decision maker to provide a set of local assertions about fixed set membership. We call influ ence diagrams with these added local assertions causal influence diagrams.
Definition 6 (Causal Influence Diagram) A causal influence diagram is an influence diagram zn which every node x is in F(D!Pa(x)).
Theorem 1 All causal influence diagrams are F maps.
Proof: Suppose that a set of chance nodes C block D from x, but that x is not in the conditional fixed set F(D IC) . Because the influence diagram is causal, it follows that at least one of x's parents-say-y would not be in F(DIC). Applying this argument recursively, until y E C, we obtain a contradiction. D
The situation is not as simple for F-maps. Let us consider the following theorem.
Theorem 2 If an influence diagram is aD-map, then it is an .1' -map.
Proof: If x E F(DjC), then x and Dare conditionally independent given C. Because the influence diagram is a V-map, it follows that C blocks D from x pro vided no head-to-head nodes or descendants of head to-head nodes that are downstream from decisions are observed. If one such node--say-y were observed, however, it would have to be in the fixed set F(D). Therefore, y and D would be independent, contradict ing the fact that there is a directed path from D to y and the influence diagram is a 'D-map. 0
Given Theorems 1 and 2, we have the following suffi cient conditions for representing cause and effect in an influence diagram.
Theorem 3 Given a causal influence diagram that is a 'D-map, C are causes for x with respect to decisions D if {1) x is a descendant of some decision node in D, and (2) C (which does not include x) is a minimal set that blocks D from x.
Proof: Because the influence diagram is a 'D-map and hence an F-map, condition 1 implies that x is not in the fixed set F(D}. Because the influence diagram is causal and hence an .1' -map, condition 2 implies that xis in the fixed set F(DjC). 0
It is reasonable to expect that decision makers will be able to construct causal influence diagrams. Such construction merely requires that the decision maker provide a set of local assessments about fixed set mem bership. Unfortunately, an influence diagram may not be a V-map. The decision problem in Figure 4b is one such example. There is a special case, however, where we can read causal relationships directly from an in fluence diagram. Following Verma and Pearl ( 1991), let us consider a special type of decision, called a set decision.
Definition 7 (Set Decision) Given an influence di agram for uncertain variables U and decisions D, a set decision for x E U with respect to D is any decision node Sx E D such that {1} Sx has alternatives "set x to k" for each state k of x and "do nothing," and (2} x is the only child of s.,.
Given a set decision Sx, we can literally set x to any of its states, or we can do nothing. When we set x to one if its states, none of the other ancestors of x contribute to the determination of x. Proof: Consider any node x. If x has no chance-node parents, then x is caused by its decision parents. If x has chance-node parents, then because the influence diagram is minimal and there exist set decisions for each such parent of x, x must not be in the fi xed set with respect to D. Furthermore, because the influence diagram is minimal and causal, Pa(x), which includes the decisions pointing to x, must be a minimal set C such that x is in the conditional fixed set F(DIC).
Consequently, x is caused by its parents. D
5
Howard Canonical Form and Causal
Mechanisms
Before making important decisions, decision analysts investigate how useful it is to gather additional infor mation. This investigation is typically done by com puting the value of information about one or more chance nodes in the domain. To compute the value of information of observing a chance variable x with respect to a decision d, one computes the decision maker's expected value given that x is observed be fore the decision d is made, and subtracts it from the decision maker's expected value given that x is not ob served before the decision is made. If the actual value of learning something about x is less than the value of information about x, we know that it is not worth while to gather such information.
According to the fundamental property of fixed set ob servation (Proposition 1), it is not possible to observe a variable outside the fixed set with respect to D. From Theorem 2, this restriction translates to the restriction that no chance variable downstream from a decision may be observed before a decision is made, assum ing that the influence diagram is a 'D-map. This rule can be stated in the fo llowing terms: If an influence diagram is a 1>-map, then it cannot contain directed cycles. In practice, this well-known rule is applied to all influence diagrams (Howard and Matheson, 1981] .
Thus, in an influence diagram that is a 1>-map, we cannot compute the value of information for any vari able x that is a descendant of a decision node. Fortu nately, with additional assessments, we can transform a given influence diagram into one where we can com pute the value of information for any chance node. Such a transformed influence diagram is said to be in Howard Canonical Form [Howard, 1994, Chapter 7] .
Definition 8 (Howard Canonical Form) An in fluence diagram is said to be in Howard Canonical Form {HCF) if {1) it is a causal influence diagram, and (2) every chance node that is a descendant of a decision node is a deterministic node.
For example, consider the simple influence diagram in Figure 5a . The corresponding influence diagram in HCF is shown in Figure 5b . In this new influence dia gram, we have added the node c(s), which is a variable that represents all possible deterministic mappings be tween smoke and lung cancer-that is, the variable represents lung cancer as a function of smoke. The possible states of this variable are shown in Table 1 . Also, by definition of c(s), lung cancer becomes a de terministic function of smoke and c( s). For example, if smoke is yes and c(s) is in state 1, then lung cancer will be yes. The uncertainty in the relationship be- Second, additional assessments typically are required in order to transform an influence diagram into HCF.
For example, only one independent probability assess ment is needed to quantify the influence diagram in Figure 5a , whereas three independent assessments are required for the node c (s) in Figure 5b . We return to this point later in this section.
Third, we can think of the c( s) as the causal mecha nism that relates smoking and lung cancer.5 Although we may not be able to observe this mechanism, we note that a clairvoyant always can. Consequently, this mechanism passes the clarity test.
Finally, although we may not be abl� to observe c(s) directly, we may be able to learn something about the mechanism. For example, we can imagine a test that measures the susceptibility of someone's lung tissue to lung cancer in the presence of tobacco smoke. to HCF. In the influence diagram shown in Figure 6a , the variable lung cancer depends on smoke and geno type. Therefore, we could extract the uncertainty in this relationship by introducing a variable that repre sents lung cancer as a function of smoke and genotype. The variable genotype, however, is already in the fixed set with respect to decisions. Therefore, we need only extract the uncertainty associated with the relation ship between smoke and lung cancer, introducing the causal mechanism c(s). As in our previous example, lung cancer is a deterministic function of smoke and c(s). In contrast to our previous example, however, c(s) depends on genotype. A similar transformation can be performed on the variable cardiovascular sta tus and its parents, yielding the HCF influence dia gram shown in Figure 6b . In this influence diagram, all chance variables are in the fixed set; and we may compute their value of information.
To transform an arbitrary influence diagram into HCF, we want to extract the uncertainty associated with each variable into an associated causal mechanism. As we have discussed, the causal mechanism for x need in clude only those parents of x that are not in the fixed set with respect to decisions.
Definition 9 (Mechanism) Given a causal influ ence diagram with uncertain variables U and decisions D, a mechanism for x E U \ F(D) with respect to D is a new variable x(Y) which represents all possible mappings from Y = Pa(x) \ F(D) to x.
If x is in the fixed set F(D), then we cannot recognize a causal mechanism associated with x. If x is not in the fixed set F(D), then a subset of the variables Y in the definition (usually, Y itself) will be causes for x. Also, by this definition, x will always be a determinis tic function of x(Y) andY.
Again, we emphasize that additional probability as sessments are required for the created nodes. If x has r states and Y has q instances, then x(Y) will have r9 states. Thus, in general, the assessment of the probabilities associated with a causal mechanism is formidable. In real-world domains, however, reason able assertions of independence often facilitate such assessments. In some cases, no additional assessments are necessary (see, e.g., Heckerman et a!. 1994).
Theorem 5 (Howard Canonical Form) Any in fluence diagram for chance nodes U and decision nodes D may be transformed into Howard Canonical Form as follows:
1. If there is a node not in F(D) pointing to a node in F(D), then reassess the influence diagram us ing a variable ordering for U where the nodes in F(D) come first 2. Add enough arcs to make the influence diagram a causal influence diagram 3. For every chance node x not in F(D),
• Add the mechanism node x(Y) to the diagram
4. Assess any additional dependencies among the variables now in the fixed set F(D)
Proof: After steps 1 (and 2), no nodes in the fixed set F(D) will be descendants of decision nodes. Therefore, after step 3, all nodes that are descendants of decisions will be deterministic nodes. Also, every mechanism node added to the diagram will be in the new fixed set F(D), by definition. Thus, all nodes downstream from decisions will be (possibly indirect) deterministic functions of elements of F(D) and D. Consequently, every node x will be in F(DIPa(x)); and hence the influence diagram will be causal. 0
The need for step 4 in the construction is illustrated by our example in Figure 6 . If we had chosen not to represent the variable genotype, we would have added arcs-say-from smoke and lung cancer to cardiovas cular status, as in Figure 4b . The construction de scribed in the theorem, ignoring the last step, would have created parentless mechanisms c( s ) and v(s, c, d).
These variables, however, would be dependent and this dependency would need to be assessed.
6
Counterfactual Reasoning
Causal models have been used to answer counterfac tual queries [Balke and Pearl, 1994] . A counterfactual query is of the form: "if a were true, then what is the probability that b would have been true, given that we know c?" In our lifestyles decision problem, a counter factual query would be: "given that I have not smoked, have maintained a good diet, have not gotten lung cancer, and my cardiovascular status has been good, what is the probability that I would have gotten lung cancer had I smoked and eaten poorly?" As we dis cuss shortly, methods for counterfactual reasoning are important, because often they can be applied to real decision problems.
Influence diagrams in HCF can also be used to an swer counterfactual queries. For example, to answer our lung-cancer query, we begin with the influence di agram in HCF shown in Figure 6b . Then, we make two copies of all variables not in the fixed set, as shown in Figure 7 . The first copy represents the actual state of affairs; and the second copy represents the coun terfactuals (in our example, smoke = yes and diet = poor). The variables in the fixed set are not copied, because, by definition, they cannot be affected by de cisions. Also, by definition of mechanism, each copy of an observable variable has the same deterministic re lationship with its mechanism. To answer our query, we instantiate the decision and chance variables in the first copy of the diagram to their observed values (no smoking, good diet, no lung cancer, and good car diovascular status, in our example). In addition, we instantiate our counterfactual decisions in the second copy of the diagram. Then, we use a standard belief network inference method to compute the probability of the variable(s) of interest (lung cancer in our exam ple}.
Using this approach, we can answer arbitrary coun terfactual queries, including queries where variables in the fixed set have been observed. For example, we can answer the query, "given that I have not smoked, have maintained a good diet, and have a genotype predis posing me to lung cancer, what is the probability that I would have gotten lung cancer had I smoked." The approach is closely related to that described by Balke and Pearl (1994) .
Procedures for counterfactual reasoning often can be used for real decision problems. For example, consider a modification of our original counterfactual query: "Given that I have not smoked and have maintained a good diet over the last year, and have not gotten lung cancer and have a good cardiovascular status, what is the probability that I will get lung cancer one year from now if I begin to smoke?" If we assume that the relationships in the original domain model do not change over the two-year time period in the query, then we may use the influence diagram in Figure 7 to answer this query. Beckerman et a!. (1994) provide another example in the domain oflogic-circuit troubleshooting. Also, see the discussion in Goldszmidt and Darwiche (1994) .
Global Causal Models
Most previous work on the graphical representation of causality concerns the situation where all interactions in a domain are causal (see, e.g., Pearl and Verma 1991 , Druzdzel and Simon 1993 , and Spirtes et al. 1993 . Here, we consider this special case, and describe correspondences between our work and the work of Pearl et al., which is representative of this body of work.
When all interactions among variables in an influence diagram are causal, we call that infl uence diagram a causal network.
Definition 10 (Causal Network) An influence di agram with uncertain variables U and decisions D is said to be a causal network for U with respect to D if Pa( x) are causes for x with respect to D for all x E U.
It follows immediately that every causal network is a causal influence diagram.
An example of a causal network is the influence di agram in Figures 2b. (Of all the influence diagrams presented in this paper, only this one is a causal net work.) As another example, we can transform the in fluence diagram of Figure 1 into a causal network by adding the decision node retroviml therapy and an arc from this node to genotype.
As in the local case, we cannot always identify causal networks using our graphical blocking condition. From Theorem 4, however, we can do so given enough set decisions. In the following corollary, a node with at least one parent but without any children is called a leaf node.
Corollary 6 A minimal causal influence diagram fo r uncertain variables U and decisions D such that D in cludes a set decision for each nonleaf uncertain van able in U is a causal network.
Pearl et al. define a causal model (or causal network) for a set of uncertain variables U to be a minimal be lief network such that every variable is caused by its parents. They take cause and effect to be a primitive notion, and do not define it. They assert that, given a causal model for U, it is likely that there exists a corresponding set decision for every variable in U.
Our approach is the reverse of theirs. We start with a definition of causality in terms of decisions, and then show that given set decisions fo r all nonleaf variables, all interactions must be causal.
Another correspondence exists. Namely, if we trans form a causal network by our definition into HCF, we obtain a model where every chance node is a determin istic function of its old parents and a single mechanism . If we assume these mechanisms are independent, we obtain Pearl et al. 's definition of a causal theory for U.
8
Future Work and Conclusions
An important aspect of causality that we have barely touched upon in this paper is the notion of time. Al though many of the results presented here are applica ble to time-varying domains, where two different nodes in an influence diagram may represent the same system variable at different points in time, there are aspects of such domains that we have yet to explore.
We have presented a practical defi nition of cause and effect in precise decision-analytic terms. We have shown how the influence diagram is sometimes inad equate fo r the graphical representation of cause (by our definition), and have shown how some inadequa cies can be eliminated. We hope that this work will begin to knit the closely related threads of research in decision analysis and causal modeling .
